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COMMENTS
VIRGINIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS*-STUDENT RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
"At common law the education of the child by the State was unknown.
In Virginia, the idea that the welfare of the State could be advanced by
the education of the masses was first advanced by Mr. [Thomas] Jeffer-
son."1 Virginia, as well as all other states, has established a system of
public education.2 The great benefits of the public school system un-
doubtedly enhance both the individual and society as a whole. Neverthe-
less, if Thomas Jefferson, the father of this great institution, were able to
observe the current conditions of public schools, he would, as the saying
goes, "roll over in his grave."
Today public schools are not merely institutions for the education of
young minds. They are institutions of violence, where student assaults on
other students and even teachers are commonplace. The schools are also
forums for illegal drug use and provide a conduit through which the drugs
are bought and sold. Disorder and disrespect are rampant, and many
compare the classroom to a "jungle" and the school to a "warzone."
"It is common knowledge that maintaining order and reasonable deco-
rum in school buildings and classrooms is a major educational problem,
and one which has increased significantly in magnitude in recent years." 3
There are many reasons for this deterioration of the public school system,
including the breakdown of the family, the greater number of students
attending school today than in the past, and the modern attitude that
school attendance is a burden and not a privilege. School teachers and
* "It has been generally held that [the term 'public school'] relates to schools established
and maintained at public expense, embracing elementary and secondary schools normally
supported by county or local authorities and does not include colleges and universities."
State ex rel. Kondos v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 154 W. Va. 276, -, 175 S.E.2d 165,
167 (1970); see also 16 MsCHIE'S JUR. Schools § 2 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
1. Flory v. Smith, 145 Va. 164, 167, 134 S.E. 360, 361 (1926).
2. The Virginia Code now requires the maintenance of public schools for all persons
within the school district over the age of five on or before September 30 of the school year
who have not reached the age of twenty on or before August 1 of the school year. VA. CODE
ANN. § 22.1-1 to -3 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
3. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 591-92 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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officials have virtually no control over these developments, yet they bear
the primary responsibility for coping with them. This presents the second
reason, equally as great, why Thomas Jefferson would be shocked by the
current conditions of the public schools. In their search for a means to
deal with the poor conditions in public schools, school officials often run
roughshod over student civil liberties. A student in a public school in the
1980's may experience beatings, censorship, suspensions or expulsion
(perhaps the most serious measure, considering the importance and value
of an education), and searches of his person (whether a "patdown" search
or a strip search), his possessions, his locker, his car, or his urine. Fur-
thermore, the student might experience searches by sniffing dogs (if this
is indeed a "search") and metal detectors. Conditions in some modern
public schools have led many to compare schools to prisons.
This Comment will examine where the current balance has been struck
between student rights and the maintenance of order in Virginia public
schools. First, this Comment will analyze the justification given for the
lessening of rights of public school students. This justification has been
used both to limit punishment of students and to restrict student rights.
Second, this Comment will discuss the discipline and punishment of stu-
dents, and will address student rights and remedies for abuse under the
common law, state statutes, and the first, eighth, and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution. The third section of this Com-
ment will concentrate on student rights under the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment is given expanded consideration due to a number
of recent measures adopted by some schools, including some in Virginia
schools, and the number of unresolved issues in this area of the law.
II. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR REDUCING STUDENT RIGHTS
Historically, there have been two justifications for lessening the rights
of public school students. The first justification, well-settled at common
law, was the doctrine of in loco parentis, meaning "in the place of the
parent."4 Under this doctrine, a school teacher or official was considered
to be acting in place of the student's parents. Accordingly, the teacher or
school official had the same power to administer punishment as the par-
ents.5 The teacher's or school official's power under this doctrine also ex-
tended into the area of searches. Thus, under this doctrine, courts have
held that a search of the student or his property by a teacher or school
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979).
5. For fairly recent cases recognizing the rule that a teacher stands in loco parentis and
shares, insofar as matters relating to school discipline are concerned, the parent's right to
use moderate force to obtain the child's obedience, see Baikie v. Luther High School, 51 Ill.
App. 3d 405, 366 N.E.2d 542 (1977); Gordon v. Oak Park School Dist., 24 Ill. App. 3d 131,
320 N.E.2d 389 (1974); Roy v. Continental Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 349 (La. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 318 So. 2d 47 (La. 1975).
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official does not invoke the protections of the fourth amendment since
school authorities are considered private individuals, not government
agents.'
The second justification, the need for order and discipline, arose to deal
with the inadequacies of the legal fiction of in loco parentis. This justifi-
cation recognizes that in order for teachers to perform their teaching du-
ties effectively, they must maintain order and discipline in the classroom.
Accordingly, teachers and school officials require the power to administer
reasonable punishment and conduct reasonable searches. Under this more
sound rationale, teachers and school officials are considered to be state
agents, not parents.
Maintenance of order is now the primary justification for the lessening
of student rights. In fact, the doctrine of in loco parentis apparently is
dead, especially in Virginia.7 The main reason for the demise of the in
loco parentis doctrine was that it necessitates logical fallacies. For exam-
ple, a teacher can discipline a pupil by corporal punishment even if the
student's parents expressly tell the teacher not to do so.' How then can
the teacher be acting in the place of the parents?
That the in loco parentis doctrine has been superceded in Virginia by
the maintenance of order justification is illustrated by section 22.1-280 of
the Virginia Code, which deals with corporal punishment. The Virginia
legislature therein allows reasonable corporal punishment of a student by
a teacher or principal "[i]n the maintenance of order and discipline."9
The Virginia statute should be contrasted with other state statutes which
are based instead on the theory that the school authority stands in loco
parentis." The West Virginia statute, for instance, states: "The teacher
shall stand in the place of the parent or guardian in exercising authority
over the student, and shall have control of all pupils enrolled in the
school from the time they reach the school until they have returned to
their respective homes . . .,,"
The in loco parentis doctrine has also lost its prominence as a justifica-
6. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
7. The doctrine of in loco parentis may still survive in some areas of school administra-
tion, such as in the context of school rules. For an article on the doctrine's decline and its
possible survival in this area, see Zirkel & Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine
Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDUc. 271 (1986).
8. Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980) (state interest in maintaining order in
schools limits a parent's right to unilaterally except a child from a regime to which other
children are subject); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.), af/d, 423 U.S. 907
(1975) (a parent's wishes cannot restrict school officials from maintaining discipline or
choosing the methods used to maintain discipline).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-280 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
10. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 24-24 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 70, § 6-114 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987).
11. W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-1 (1984).
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tion for conducting searches of students. This is due to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O." In that case, the
Court expressly rejected the in loco parentis doctrine. 3 The Court stated:
"Today's public school officials do not merely exercise authority volunta-
rily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in further-
ance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies."" In
place of the doctrine of in loco parentis the Court recognized that the
school's legitimate interest in maintaining order in the school requires
flexibility in school disciplinary procedures.' 5 The Court noted the "sub-
stantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline
in the classroom and on school grounds" and cited the importance of "the
preservation of order and a proper educational environment." 6
The importance of the justification used by the states and courts to
give teachers and school officials greater flexibility in dealing with stu-
dents should be evident. The justification draws boundary lines between
what a teacher will be allowed to do and the student's rights.
In Virginia, the maintenance of order justification has superceded the
in loco parentis doctrine. The effects of this on the law are discussed in
the remainder of this Comment.
III. DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT OF STUDENTS
The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has
stated: "No school child has a constitutional right to be free from disci-
pline. Indeed, discipline in school is a boon, not a curse."' 7 This is consis-
tent with the courts' and legislatures' generally favorable views of disci-
pline in schools." The importance of discipline as a part of education was
elaborated upon by Justice Powell in his dissent in Goss v. Lopez.1 9 Jus-
tice Powell wrote:
Education in any meaningful sense includes the inculcation of an under-
standing in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This
12. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
13. Id. at 336-37. Although the Court rejected the doctrine, the Court limited students'
rights in order to accommodate the school's need to preserve order. For authority discussing
T.L.O., see Martens v. Board of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 29, 31 (N.D. Il1. 1985); Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule in the Public School Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding: Answer-
ing the Question After New Jersey v. T.L.O., 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1133, 1143 (1986).
14. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
15. Id. at 339-40.
16. Id. at 339; see also infra notes 146-64 and accompanying text.
17. Bernstein v. Menard, 557 F. Supp. 90, 91 (E.D. Va. 1982), appeal dismissed, 728 F.2d
252 (4th Cir. 1984).
18. This is not, of course, to say that all punishment is good. Limitations on punishment
will be discussed further.
19. 419 U.S. 565 (1975); see also infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
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understanding is no less important than learning to read and write. One
who does not comprehend the meaning and necessity of discipline is handi-
capped not merely in his education but throughout his subsequent life. In
an age when the home and church play a diminishing role in shaping the
character and value judgments of the young, a heavier responsibility falls
upon the schools. 20
Yet, the question remains as to how far the power of school officials to
discipline students extends. One limitation on this power concerns the
right of school officials to discipline students for conduct occurring off
school grounds. It is generally established that "the power of school au-
thorities over pupils does not cease absolutely when the pupils leave the
school premises."21 Although no Virginia cases have dealt with the issue
of just how far the school's power extends, two main rules have been es-
tablished by other jurisdictions. First, many states have held that school
officials have the power to discipline students for out-of-school conduct,
whether or not occurring on school grounds, which has a direct and im-
mediate effect on the discipline or general welfare of the school.22 Second,
a number of states have held that schools may discipline students for
misconduct on their way to school or on their way home from school.2
Stating the converse of this second rule, some courts have developed the
limitation that the school may not punish students for conduct taking
place after the student has arrived home from school.24
Another limitation on the school's power, was set out by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Shanley v. Northeast Independent School Dis-
trict.25 There the court prevented punishment by school officials of a stu-
dent for out-of-school conduct involving first amendment protected
activity absent a showing of "'material and substantial' disruption" of
the normal operations of the school.26
Although school officials' power to discipline students is limited some-
what when the student engages in conduct off school grounds, school au-
thorities are given broad discretion in the discipline and control of stu-
20. Goss, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting). To some this view may seem obviously
correct. Nevertheless, as Justice Powell pointed out, "[tihere is, no doubt, a school of mod-
ern psychological or psychiatric persuasion that maintains that any discipline of the young
is detrimental." Id. at 598 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
21. Annotation, Right to Discipline Pupil for Conduct Away from School Grounds or Not
Immediately Connected with School Activities, 53 A.L.R.3D 1124, 1128 (1973); see also 68
Am. JUR. 2D Schools § 256 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
23. See, e.g., Id. at 524 n.7; Abremski v. Southeastern School Dist. Bd. of Directors, 54
Pa. Commw. 292, 421 A.2d 485 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Jones v. Day, 127 Miss. 136, 89 So. 906 (1921) (school board cannot require
pupils to wear uniforms at home).
25. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
26. Id. at 974.
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dents on school premises." However, the discretion to administer
punishment is limited. The next two sections of this Comment address
limitations on the use of corporal punishment, suspension and expulsion.
A. Corporal Punishment of Students
1. Background
"At common law a single principle has governed the use of corporal
punishment since before the American Revolution: Teachers may impose
reasonable but not excessive force to discipline a child."2 This basic rule
has not changed:
Classroom use of corporal punishment has survived the transformation of
primary and secondary education from the reliance of the [American]
Colonials on optional private arrangements to the present system of com-
pulsory education and dependence on public schools. Despite the general
abandonment of corporal punishment as a means of punishing criminal of-
fenders in the United States, the practice of corporal punishment in the
classroom continues to play a role in the public education of school-children
in nearly every part of the United States.29
The common-law rule of allowing reasonable corporal punishment has
been adopted by statute in Virginia. Section 22.1-280 of the Virginia Code
states:
In the maintenance of order and discipline and in the exercise of a sound
discretion, a principal or a teacher in a public school or a school maintained
by the State may administer reasonable corporal punishment on a pupil
under his authority, provided he acts in good faith and such punishment is
not excessive.30
Accordingly, in Virginia, corporal punishment of students must be: (1)
reasonable and not excessive;31 (2) administered in good faith; and (3)
administered for the purpose of maintaining order and discipline.
27. See Annotation, Marriage or Pregnancy of Public School Student as Ground for Ex-
pulsion or Exclusion, or of Restriction of Activities, 11 A.L.R.3D 996, 997 (1967).
28. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); Teacher's Use of Excessive Corporal
Punishment, 20 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 2D 511, 521 (1979) [hereinafter Excessive Corpo-
ral Punishment]; see also Note, Schools-Corporal Punishment Without Civil or Criminal
Liability, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 399, 399 (1970).
29. Excessive Corporal Punishment, supra note 28, at 520 (footnotes omitted).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-280 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
31. "Excessive punishment refers to a situation where punishment in itself is proper but
where the extent of the punishment is questioned .... Annotation, Criminal Liability for
Excessive or Improper Punishment Inflicted on Child by Parent, Teacher, or One in Loco
Parentis, 89 A.L.R.2D 396, 399 (1963). "Not excessive" is treated as being within the concept
of "reasonable" for the rest of this comment.
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2. Controversy Over Corporal Punishment
The common-law view and the Virginia statute which codified it have
been under increasing attack for a number of years. There is substantial
controversy over whether corporal punishment should be allowed at all in
public schools. On one side are those who argue that corporal punishment
is necessary to obtain obedience. These advocates point to the adage,
"spare the rod, and spoil the child."3 2 On the other side "are many...
who believe that school officials can and and [sic] should maintain [disci-
pline] without using corporal punishment. [This] view is shared by many
professional educators, parents and others." 33 They argue that violence
breeds violence and that while corporal punishment will unquestionably
control the student, it will also "instill fear, thwart the purposes of educa-
tion, and produce a person who believes that physical violence is the an-
swer to most problems and confrontations in life." 4
The controversy over corporal punishment becomes perhaps most
heated in those cases where the courts have dealt with whether school
officials may administer corporal punishment despite the parents' express
commands to the contrary. As was stated earlier, parental approval of
corporal punishment is not constitutionally required. 5 In Hall v. Tawney,
where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided such a case, the court
quoted from Baker v. Owen:
36
Opinion on the merits of the rod is far from unanimous. On such a contro-
versial issue, where we would be acting more from personal preference than
from constitutional command, we cannot allow the wishes of a parent to
restrict school officials' discretion in deciding the methods to be used in ac-
complishing the not just legitimate, but essential purpose of maintaining
discipline.37
The Baker court had added that "[s]o long as the force used is reasona-
ble . . . school officials are free to employ corporal punishment for disci-
plinary purposes until in the exercise of their own professional judgment,
or in response to concerted pressure from opposing parents, they decide
that its harm outweighs its utility."38
32. Some Biblical passages also tend to support the use of corporal punishment. For ex-
ample, Proverbs 23:13-14 (King James) states: "Withhold not correction from the child: for
if thou beatest him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and
shalt deliver his soul from hell."
33. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
34. Excessive Corporal Punishment, supra note 28, at 523.
35. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 n.22 (1977); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th
Cir. 1980); Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 299.
36. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
37. Hall, 621 F.2d at 610 (quoting Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 301).
38. Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 301.
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
To date, only two states, Massachusetts and New Jersey, have totally
banned the use of corporal punishment in schools.39 As the Supreme
Court noted in Ingraham v. Wright:
The concept that reasonable corporal punishment in school is justifiable
continues to be recognized in the laws of most States .... It represents the
'balance struck by this country'. . . between the child's interest in personal
security and the traditional view that some limited corporal punishment
may be necessary in the course of a child's education.4
3. The "Reasonable" Standard
There is no satisfactory answer as to what the common law and the
Virginia statute allow as "reasonable" corporal punishment. In Carpenter
v. Commonwealth,4 the Supreme Court of Virginia discussed an analo-
gous standard in a case involving an assault and battery committed upon
a seven-year-old girl by one in loco parentis to her. The court observed
that:
Words such as . 'moderate' . and 'reasonable' as applied to chastise-
ment are ever changing according to the ideas prevailing in our minds dur-
ing the period and conditions in which we live. Where a question is raised as
to whether punishment has been moderate or excessive, the fact is one for
the jury to determine from the attending circumstances, considering the
age, size and conduct of the child, the nature of his misconduct, the nature
of the instrument used for punishment, and the kind of marks or wounds
inflicted on the body of the child."2
This comports with the rule of other jurisdictions. 3 A minority of states
have taken the view that a presumption of reasonableness exists.4 4 This is
most likely not the law in Virginia.45
39. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37(G) (West Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1
(West 1968).
40. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676 (citation omitted).
41. 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (1947).
42. Id. at 863, 44 S.E.2d at 424-25; see also Harbaugh v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695, 167
S.E.2d 329 (1969) (parent or person in loco parentis may be criminally liable for assault and
battery if he inflicts corporal punishment which exceeds the bounds of due moderation;
whether punishment is moderate or excessive is a question for the jury).
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Cotton, 346 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 354
So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1977); Frank v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 195 So. 2d 451 (La. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 250 La. 635, 197 So. 2d 653 (La. 1967); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 150 (1965) (factors involved in determining reasonableness of punishment).
44. See, e.g., Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889 (1941) (presumption in
favor of correctness of teacher's action in inflicting corporal punishment upon the pupil).
45. See Carpenter, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (no presumption mentioned).
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4. Civil and Criminal Liability
When a teacher or school official oversteps the legal boundary and ad-
ministers unreasonable or excessive corporal punishment, he or she may
face civil46 and criminal47 liability. "[C]orporal punishment which is rea-
sonable in degree, and which is administered by a teacher ... as a disci-
plinary measure, is 'privileged' in the sense that the administration of
such punishment does not give rise to a cause of action for damages
against the teacher. '48 Where the teacher, however, administers unrea-
sonable punishment, that teacher is no longer immune from civil liability.
Where the teacher applies excessive force, he will be liable for so much of
the force as is excessive.4
9
Similarly, "a teacher may inflict upon a pupil punishment which is rea-
sonable under the . . . circumstances, without incurring criminal liability
for an assault, or a similar offense . . . 2 10 Nonetheless, if the punish-
ment is "inflicted with malice or cause[s] permanent injury or death of
the child [it] exceeds the special privilege . . . accorded by the law...
and renders [the teacher] criminally liable under the same circumstances
under which liability would exist in the absence of the special relation-
ship." 51 A Virginia case applying this rule is Johnson v. Commonwealth.2
In Johnson, the court upheld the murder conviction of a school teacher
who, in the course of disciplining a seven-year-old child had put her
across his lap and repeatedly whipped her with a switch so savagely that
her bladder was ruptured and she died.5 '
Apparently, under Virginia Code section 63.1-248.3, a teacher who wit-
nesses or in any other way "has reason to believe" that another teacher
has inflicted unreasonable or excessive corporal punishment on a student
under eighteen years of age has a statutory duty to report the abuse
"immediately."54 Failure to make such a report results in criminal lia-
46. See generally Annotation, Teacher's Civil Liability for Administering Corporal Pun-
ishment to Pupil, 43 A.L.R.2D 469 (1955).
47. See generally Annotation, Criminal Liability for Excessive or Improper Punishment
Inflicted on Child by Parent, Teacher, or One in Loco Parentis, 89 A.L.R.2D 396 (1963).
48. Annotation, supra note 46, at 472 (footnote omitted).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 155(a) (1965).
50. Annotation, supra note 47, at 404.
51. Id. at 410.
52. 111 Va. 877, 69 S.E. 1104 (1911).
53. After she was whipped, the child sat in the classroom perspiring and trembling. Tak-
ing notice of this, the teacher told the child to get away from the stove in the schoolroom, to
go wash her hands and face, and then decided to send the girl home early. While the child
was slowly making her two-mile walk home, the teacher overtook her in his buggy. He asked
how she felt, then told her "to run on." When the child finally reached home, she was put to
bed. She died a few days later. Id. at 881-82, 69 S.E. at 1106.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1987). A student under eighteen years of
age to whom a physical or mental injury is inflicted by other than accidental means is an
1988] 249
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bility.55 To further encourage the making of reports, section 63.1-248.5
gives a teacher making such a report immunity from any civil or criminal
liability in connection with making the report, "unless it is proven that
the reporting teacher acted with malicious intent. '5
5. Constitutional Protections
a. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Safeguards
Other than the common law's provision for civil and criminal liability
for teachers who administer excessive corporal punishment, the student
has very few other protections against the infliction of corporal punish-
ment. However, a number of cases have dealt with the issue of the exis-
tence of constitutional protections and federal remedies.
The most important of these cases was the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright.51 In Ingraham, a student who
was slow to respond to his teacher's instructions was subjected to more
than twenty licks with a paddle while being held over a table in the prin-
cipal's office.58 "The paddling was so severe that [the student] suffered a
hematoma requiring medical attention and keeping him out of school for
several days."59 The student brought an action for deprivation of his con-
stitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. section 198360 and a class action for
declaratory and injunctive relief filed on behalf of all students in the
county school system. 1 The district court dismissed the complaint, and
the Supreme Court affirmed.
62
First, the Court held that the paddling of students as a means of main-
taining school discipline does not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the eighth amendment, reasoning that the eighth
"abused or neglected child." Id. § 63.1-248.2(A)(1). A teacher responsible for the student's
care is a person who may be responsible for abusing or neglecting a child. Id. § 63.1-
248.2(A).
55. Id. § 63.1-248.3(B) states: "Any person required to file a report . . . who is found
guilty of failure to do so shall be fined not more than $500 for the first failure and for any
subsequent failures not less than $100 nor more than $1,000."
56. Id. § 63.1-248.5.
57. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
58. Id. at 657.
59. Id.
60. Under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person acting under color of
law who deprives another of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution is
liable to the injured party. For the plaintiff to recover under section 1983, he must establish
an invasion of federally-protected constitutional rights.
61. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653-54.
62. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion. He was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens dissented.
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amendment does not apply to corporal punishment of students. The
Court stated:
An examination of the history of the [eighth] Amendment and the decisions
of this Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punish-
ment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes. We
adhere to this longstanding limitation and hold that the Eighth Amendment
does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining disci-
pline in public schools.
8 3
Thus, as Justice White pointed out in his dissent, under the Court's deci-
sion, "corporal punishment in public schools, no matter how severe, can
never be the subject of the protections afforded by the Eighth
Amendment." '64
The Court next addressed the issue of whether the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment required prior notice and an opportunity to
be heard. 5 The Court initially determined that corporal punishment of a
student by public school authorities did implicate substantial "Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interests.""6 Turning to the question of what
process was due, however, the Court found that notice and a hearing were
not necessary. The Court reasoned that the common-law remedies were
adequate to afford due process:
In those cases where severe punishment is contemplated, the available civil
and criminal sanctions for abuse-considered in light of the openness of the
school environment-afford significant protection against unjustified corpo-
ral punishment .... Teachers and school authorities are unlikely to inflict
corporal punishment unnecessarily or excessively when a possible conse-
quence of doing so is the institution of civil or criminal proceedings against
them.
67
In its conclusion, the majority elaborated:
In view of the low incidence of abuse, the openness of our schools, and the
common-law safeguards that already exist, the risk of error that may result
in violation of a schoolchild's substantive rights can only be regarded as
minimal. Imposing additional administrative safeguards as a constitutional
requirement might reduce that risk marginally, but would also entail a sig-
nificant intrusion into an area of primary educational responsibility. We
conclude that the Due Process Clause does not require notice and a hearing
prior to the imposition of corporal punishment in the public schools, as that
practice is authorized and limited by the common law.66
63. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
64. Id. at 683 (White, J., dissenting).
65. The Ingraham Court granted limited certiorari and did not address the substantive
due process issue. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
66. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 674.
67. Id. at 678.
68. Id. at 682.
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The Supreme Court in Ingraham did not review substantive due pro-
cess claims. The Fourth Circuit in Hall v. Tawney noted that Ingraham
left open the question of a substantive due process claim for corporal
punishment of a student.6 9 The Hall court thought that the failure of the
Supreme Court in Ingraham to deal with the issue was an "anomaly"
brought about by procedural considerations. Specifically, the Supreme
Court had not granted certiorari to consider the question of a substantive
due process violation.70 The Fourth Circuit in Hall was thus forced to
decide the issue without the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance.
Hall involved the rather violent struggle with and paddling of a student
by school authorities, which resulted in the student being hospitalized for
ten days. 71 The district court had dismissed the action brought by the
student and her parents under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against various offi-
cials and employees of the school system. The Fourth Circuit reversed in
part, however, holding that the student's complaint stated a claim for re-
lief against some of the defendants. 2
The Hall court first noted that the procedural due process and eighth
amendment claims were foreclosed by Ingraham.73 The court then ad-
dressed the substantive due process issue. The court held that although
disciplinary corporal punishment does not per se violate the public school
child's substantive due process rights, "substantive due process rights
might be implicated in school disciplinary punishments even though pro-
cedural due process is afforded by adequate state civil and criminal reme-
dies, and though cruel and unusual punishment is not implicated at all. '74
In determining whether specific corporal punishment administered by
state school officials gives rise to an independent cause of action to vindi-
cate substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the
court rejected the common-law standard of reasonableness. The court
pointed out that "not every state law tort becomes a federally cognizable
'constitutional tort' under section 1983 simply because it is committed by
a state official. . . ."7 Rather, the court adopted the same standard used
for substantive due process claims in police brutality cases. The court
stated:
[T]he substantive due process inquiry in school corporal punishment cases
must be whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so dispro-
69. 621 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 610, 611 n.4. The Supreme Court case of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
decided after Hall, has not necessarily weakened this analysis by the Fourth Circuit in In-
graham. Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Va. 1982).
71. Hall, 621 F.2d at 614.
72. Id. at 613.
73. Id. at 609.
74. Id. at 611 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 613.
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portionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism
rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a
brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience." 76
Although the Hall court found its standard satisfied under the facts of
that case, the "shocking to the conscience" standard is a high one. This is
illustrated by the case of Brooks v. School Board.7 7 In dismissing the stu-
dent's section 1983 action alleging deprivation of fourteenth amendment
substantive due process rights, the Brooks court based its decision on two
factors. First, the court found that the alleged conduct of the teacher in
disciplining the student by piercing her upper arm with a straight pin did
not descend to the level of a brutal and inhumane, conscience-shocking
episode required to establish a substantive due process violation. s The
court quipped: allegations of defamation did not shock the conscience of
the United States Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis,"' and "[s]urely the
defamation of one's good name is a more shocking event than being stuck
with a pin. If the pen is mightier than a sword, it must be mightier than a
pin."' 0 The second basis for the court's decision was the student's failure
to allege specifically that the teacher had any intent to deprive her of a
specific constitutional right. The court held that this was required under
section 1983.81
The Hall court did dismiss the section 1983 action brought against a
number of the school officials named as defendants because they had not
been directly involved in the infliction of the corporal punishment. To be
properly named as a defendant, the teacher or school official must be al-
leged specifically to have "directed, supervised, participated in, author-
ized or. . .condoned by knowing acquiescence" the administration of the
corporal punishment."2
76. Id. But see Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), reh'g granted, 802 F.2d 1486
(4th Cir. 1986). Justice involved a section 1983 action against a state trooper for alleged
unconstitutional excessive force. The court held that a jury instruction repeating verbatim
the Hall language did not properly state the standard governing the case at bar. Id. at 576.
The court expressly refused to overrule Hall or say it was erroneously decided. Id. at 576
n.3. Apparently, then, the Hall standard is correct for cases involving corporal punishment
in schools. Nevertheless, Justice throws considerable doubt on the Hall standard even in
this context, especially since the Hall court stated that it was adopting the police brutality
standard. The Justice court found that the jury instruction implied that malice or sadism
was a requirement for imposing liability on the trooper. Id. at 578. The court said this "mis-
states the law of this circuit." Id.
77. 569 F. Supp. 1534 (E.D. Va. 1983).
78. Id. at 1536.
79. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
80. Brooks, 569 F. Supp. at 1536. Although this is an amusing play on words, it is a ques-
tionable rationale for the court's decision.
81. Id. at 1538.
82. Hall, 621 F.2d at 615; see also O'Connor v. Keller, 510 F. Supp. 1359, 1373-74 (D. Md.
1981).
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b. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause Safeguards
A school district's use of corporal punishment may also violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although this issue
has not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court, the lower courts are in
agreement that "those who claim that the school district's corporal pun-
ishment regulations are violative of the equal protection clause must
prove that the regulations were unequally applied to students similarly
situated with no rational basis for such unequal treatment. 8 3 This gives
the student little added protection because (1) the student bears a high
burden of proof, and (2) a claim under the equal protection clause does
not attack the infliction of the corporal punishment, but only alleges that
the punishment was applied unequally.
B. Suspension and Expulsion of Students
The right of public school attendance is necessarily conditioned on
compliance by the student with the reasonable rules and requirements of
the school authorities. Breaches of these rules or requirements may prop-
erly be punished by suspension or expulsion. As the Virginia Supreme
Court stated in Flory v. Smith: 4
[I]t is neither restraint nor infringement for the Legislature to enact laws to
debar a child from the mere privilege of acquiring an education at the ex-
pense of the state until he is willing to submit himself to all reasonable
regulations enacted for the purpose of promoting efficiency and maintaining
discipline."'
Unlike corporal punishment, there is no controversy concerning expul-
sion as a method of punishment. Controversy exists only over the proce-
dures used in deciding when this punishment may be used.
1. Procedural Requirements
In Goss v. Lopez,8" a case involving a challenge under the fourth
amendment to a student's ten day suspension from school, the United
States Supreme Court scrutinized suspensions under a procedural due
process analysis. While the Court noted that states are not constitution-
ally obligated to establish and maintain a public school system,87 once the
83. Henderson, Constitutional Implications Involving the Use of Corporal Punishment
in the Public Schools: A Comprehensive Review, 15 J. L. & EDUC. 255, 269 (1986).
84. 145 Va. 164, 134 S.E. 360 (1926).
85. Id. at 171, 134 S.E. at 363.
86. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
87. Education is not a right protected by the United States Constitution. San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
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state does so, a student's right to attend is a property interest protected
by the due process clause.8 8 The Court stated that although the authority
possessed by the state to proscribe and enforce standards of conduct in
its schools is "very broad," the authority must still be exercised consist-
ently with constitutional safeguards, such as the minimum procedures re-
quired by the due process clause.8 9
While pointing out that "[s]uspension is considered not only to be a
necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational device," 90 the
Court held that a ten day suspension from school is not de minimis and
could not be imposed in disregard of the due process clause.91 The Court
explained that with a suspension there is a temporary denial of the prop-
erty interest in educational benefits and that the student's liberty interest
in reputation is also implicated.2
The Court then laid down the minimum procedural requirements
under the due process clause:
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less,
that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have
and an opportunity to present his side of the story.9
Further explaining these due process requirements as "rudimentary pre-
cautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary
exclusion from school,"94 the Court stated that there need be no delay
between the time notice is given and the time of the hearing. 5 Accord-
ingly, the school official may informally discuss the misconduct with the
student minutes after it has occurred. The Court pointed out that it was
holding only that, "in being given an opportunity to explain his version of
the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of
doing and what the basis of the accusation is."98 The Court further stated
the general rule that notice and a hearing should precede removal of the
student from school. An exception to this, however, exists when the stu-
dent's presence "poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an
ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process." ''
A Virginia case applying Goss is Hillman v. Elliott,9 8 involving a three
88. Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 580.
91. Id. at 576.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 581.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 582.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 436 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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day suspension of a student. The court there held that a three day sus-
pension was not de minimis, but found on the facts of the case that due
process was afforded the student.9 Notice and a hearing were held to
have been provided by a three-way conversation between the principal,
the student, and the student's mother, during which the student admitted
using abusive language. The court noted that "due process in the school
setting does not have to adhere to prescribed patterns." 0 0 The Hillman
court also held that nothing prevented the school principal from sitting as
a hearing officer in a school discipline case. 10' The court stated that "[tlo
be denied due process, plaintiff must show prejudice by the principal
stemming from a source other than knowledge of the case."102
The Virginia statute dealing with suspensions and expulsions comports
with the requirements of Goss. Section 22.1-277 sets out the minimum
procedures that school boards must prescribe in suspending or expelling
students. 0 3 The requirements differ for suspensions of ten days or less,
suspensions of more than ten days, and expulsions. 04 The minimum pro-
cedures required by the statute for suspensions of ten days or less are the
same as in Goss, requiring only an informal meeting between the par-
ties.'0 5 The right to a full due process hearing is provided in the other two
situations."'
2. Cause for Suspension or Expulsion
Virginia Code section 22.1-277(A) also gives school authorities the
power to suspend or expel pupils from attendance at school for "sufficient
cause." '0 Another issue arising in expulsion cases is whether sufficient
cause exists for a particular suspension or expulsion.
"[T]he enactment of regulations for the administration of schools and
discipline and control of students is primarily a matter for the adminis-
trative authorities concerned, who have a wide measure of discretion in
this respect."'' 08 The courts may review such administrative actions, how-
ever, to protect against arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of that discre-
99. Id. at 815, 817.
100. Id. at 815.
101. Id. at 816.
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277 (Repi. Vol. 1985). Section 22.1-278 provides that school
boards must adopt their own regulations governing suspension and explusion of pupils, pre-
scribing at least the minimum procedures set forth in § 22.1-277.
104. See id. § 22.1-277.
105. See id. § 22.1-277(B).
106. See id. § 22.1-277(B) -277(C).
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277(A).
108. Annotation, supra note 27, at 997.
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tion.1°9 Section 22.1-87 of the Virginia Code requires circuit courts to re-
view actions of school boards on proper petition.1 0 The statute states
further that "[t]he action of the school board shall be sustained unless
the school board exceeded its authority, acted arbitrarily or capriciously,
or abused its discretion.""' A Virginia circuit court commenting on its
power in such a case pointed out:
[I]t is not the role of this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the
School Board. While a school board does not have unbridled discretion, its
decisions must be respected by the courts if it acted within its authority. It
even has the right to be wrong if it does not exceed its authority or abuse its
discretion."'
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases where courts have found in-
sufficient cause to suspend or expel. Perhaps the most far-reaching of
these cases is Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District."3 In
Tinker, high school students were suspended for wearing black arm bands
to protest the Vietnam War. The Supreme Court found the suspensions
improper, holding that prohibitions against expression of opinion, with-
out any evidence that the prohibition is necessary to avoid substantial
interference with school discipline or the rights of others, is impermissible
under the first amendment. The Court stated, "in our system, state-oper-
ated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do
not possess absolute authority over their students.""24 In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Black, stated that the majority's decision would subject
"all the public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their
loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students." 1" 5
One of the few Virginia cases dealing with the "sufficient cause" issue is
the circuit court case of Johnson v. Bedford County School Board."6
Johnson involved the successful challenge by a high school student of his
expulsion. He had been expelled because he had been charged with a
murder which occurred off school grounds. Noting "a person is presumed
innocent until proven guilty," the court held that "expulsion of a student
109. Id.
110. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-87 (Repl. Vol. 1985). A case involving the expulsion of a handi-
capped child can be brought under the Education for All of the Handicapped Children Act,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). It should be noted, however, that scrutiny
under the federal procedures is much more strict than under those provided by the Virginia
statute. Resort to the federal courts in an inappropriate case may result in a finding that the
action is frivolous. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Menard, 557 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd, 728
F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1984).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-87 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
112. Johnson v. Bedford County School Bd., 2 Va. Cir. 110, 113 (1983).
113. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
114. Id. at 511.
115. Id. at 525 (Blacl, J., dissenting).
116. 2 Va. Cir. 110.
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solely because he has been charged with a felony would be an abuse of
School Board discretion." 117 The court pointed out, however, that:
[I]f a student is expelled after an investigation of the facts because his con-
tinued presence at school would tend to cause disruption, concern and fear
on the part of the student body and teachers, then ... there is an inherent
power in the school board to suspend or expel prior to trial whether the
charge is a felony or misdemeanor. 118
This is because the "[r]ights of other students and teachers must be
respected as well as the rights of the person charged." 19
Suspensions or expulsions have also been attacked for lack of sufficient
cause where the reason for them has been the marriage or pregnancy,2
or the physical or mental illness of the student. 2 ' Related to the second
of these is the issue of the handicapped student.' 22 "The discipline of
handicapped children . . . involves more complex issues than those that
are present in the suspension or expulsion of nonhandicapped chil-
dren. 1 23 Special protection for the handicapped child in public schools
came with passage by Congress of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA).' 24 The EAHCA provisions were held to apply to
the attempted expulsion of a handicapped child from public school in
School Board v. Malone.'2 5
In Malone, a student with a learning disability was expelled for distrib-
uting drugs within the school.' 26 The court found first that the expulsion
of a handicapped student from school is a "change in placement trigger-
ing the procedural protections of the EAHCA.' '' 27 The court determined
117. Id. at 112.
118. Id. The court used the following example to illustrate its point:
[I]f a student is charged with forging a check (a felony), he probably could not be
expelled unless he was convicted of the offense. This is because such an offense is not
likely to cause disruption of the school process. On the other hand, if he is caught
distributing drugs to other students and charged with that offense, he might be sus-
pended or expelled before he is tried if the facts are investigated and the expulsion is
for the protection and benefit of other students attending the school.
Id.
119. Id. at 113.
120. See Annotation, supra note 27.
121. See Annotation, Physical or Mental Illness as Basis of Dismissal of Student from
School, College, or University, 17 A.L.R.4TH 519 (1982).
122. See generally Note, School Discipline and the Handicapped Child, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1453 (1982).
123. Id. at 1463.
124. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
125. 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1980).
126. A claim under EAHCA challenging the expulsion of a handicapped child is brought
pursuant to the Act's provisions rather than pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-87. Thus, the
review is before the federal district court, and not a Virginia circuit court.
127. Malone, 762 F.2d at 1218.
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that the child's unacceptable behavior in this case was caused by his
handicap, and concluded that the child could not be expelled.128 If it is
determined under EAHCA procedures that a handicapped child's handi-
cap did not cause his misconduct, that child may then be expelled.'29 In
Malone the causal connection between the child's handicap and his be-
havior was very tenuous. There was testimony that the student's learning
disability caused him to leap at chances for peer approval, which he re-
ceived for distributing drugs. 30 The court concluded from this that the
student's handicap caused his disruptive behavior.131
The court in Malone did not decide whether a brief temporary suspen-
sion would be regarded as a change in placement reviewable under
EAHCA procedures. The court suggested, however, that this would not be
a change in placement. 132
3. Other Exclusions from School
Another issue involving the temporary exclusion of students from
school was presented in the Virginia case of Pleasants v. Common-
wealth. 33 In Pleasants, a number of protesting students gathered on
school grounds during school hours and demanded the readmission to
school of previously suspended students. After a number of hours, the
principal told the approximately 150 to 200 students either to return to
class or board a bus to go home. When the students continued their dis-
turbance, police officers called to the scene arrested thirty-seven students,
at which point the others dispersed."4 The court held that the students'
subsequent convictions for trespass were proper.135
The court observed first that the Virginia trespass statute applied to
public as well as to private property."38 The court reasoned further that
the principal was a duly authorized agent of the school board and was
responsible for maintaining discipline in the school. Accordingly, the
principal "was vested with the inherent power to revoke, for good cause,
the right of any student to remain upon school property when that stu-
dent, alone or in concert with others, disrupted regular school activities
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1216.
131. Id. Under this line of reasoning, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a handi-
cap would not "cause" the student's misconduct. Most psychologists would probably agree
that the desire for peer approval is a significant motivation for all adolescent behavior.
132. Id. at 1215 n.8.
133. 214 Va. 646, 203 S.E.2d 114 (1974).
134. Id. at 647-48, 203 S.E.2d at 115.
135. Id. at 650, 203 S.E.2d at 117.
136. Id. at 648, 203 S.E.2d at 115 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-119 (Repl. Vol. 1982)).
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for the maintenance of good order and discipline."' 37 The court noted
that in this case it was "not only the right, but the duty, of the principal
to take reasonable measures to restore order so that the educational pro-
cess might continue."1 8
The defendants, relying principally on Tinker v. Des Moines Commu-
nity School District139 argued that such a holding would result in a viola-
tion of first amendment rights. The court rejected this argument, how-
ever, finding that the students' actions were not "immunized" because
their conduct "materially disrupted classwork, created substantial disor-
der and materially interfered with the rights of others."' 4 0
IV. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The greatest amount of controversy in the area of student civil rights is
focused on the applicability of the fourth amendment to public school
students. Only a small number of cases nationwide have dealt with this
issue. No Virginia cases have addressed the question. Cases from other
jurisdictions, however, shed some light on what Virginia courts are likely
to decide when they are presented with a fourth amendment challenge to
a public school official's search of a student.
A. Background
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.1 41
Until recently, proponents of the notion that the public school student
was not protected by the fourth amendment relied upon two underlying
theories. The first theory posited that students were not "persons" pro-
tected under the fourth amendment.' 42 This view was rejected in Tinker
v. Des Moines Community School District'4" where the United States Su-
preme Court stated: "Students in school as well as out of school are 'per-
sons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect .... ,,44
137. Id. at 648-49, 203 S.E.2d at 115-16.
138. Id. at 649, 203 S.E.2d at 116.
139. 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
140. Pleasants, 214 Va. at 650, 203 S.E.2d at 117.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
142. Trosch, Williams & DeVore, Public School Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 11
J. L. & EDUc. 41, 43-44 (1982).
143. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
144. Id. at 511.
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The second theory was based on the common-law doctrine of in loco
parentis. Under this theory the school official did not act as an agent of
the state, but rather stood "in the place of the parent."'14 5 Accordingly,
school officials could avoid the restrictions of the fourth amendment be-
cause they acted only as private citizens. 46 The majority of cases consid-
ering the issue, however, found this theory unsound, pointing out that
school officials are employed by the government and are thus state
agents.147 This second theory was finally put to rest by the landmark de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 14 s a
decision which decided important issues but, unfortunately, left numer-
ous others in its wake.
B. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
T.L.O. involved the search of a public high school student's purse by
the assistant vice-principal after two teachers discovered the student
smoking in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule. The assistant
vice principal questioned the student, but she denied that she had been
smoking and claimed that she did not smoke at all. Opening the student's
purse to search for cigarettes, the assistant vice-principal found not only
a pack of cigarettes, but also rolling papers, which are commonly associ-
ated with the use of marijuana. He then searched the purse thoroughly.
He found marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money
in one-dollar bills, an index card containing a list of other students who
owed the student money, and two letters that implicated the student in
marijuana dealing. The assistant vice-principal turned the evidence over
to the police, to whom the student later confessed that she had been sell-
ing marijuana at the high school. The state thereafter brought delin-
quency charges against the student in the Juvenile and Domestic Rela-
tions Court. In her hearing, the student contended that the search
violated the fourth amendment and she moved to suppress the evidence
found in her purse as well as the confession, which, she argued, was
tainted by the allegedly unlawful search. 49
In an opinion written by Justice White, 50 the Court held that the
145. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); Common-
wealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715
(Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
147. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1081
(1985).
148. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
149. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1985).
150. Justice Powell, with whom Justice O'Connor joined, filed a concurring opinion. Id. at
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fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials.'51 All
seven justices hearing the case concurred with this point of the opinion.
The Court rejected the in loco parentis doctrine argument, stating that
"school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surro-
gates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. ' 15 2 The Court then pointed out
that students in school do have legitimate expectations of privacy, even in
articles of personal property "unnecessarily" brought into the school. The
Court stated:
Although this Court may take notice of the difficulty of maintaining disci-
pline in the public schools today, the situation is not so dire that students
in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations of privacy. We have
recently recognized that the need to maintain order in a prison is such that
prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their cells, but it
goes almost without saying that '[t]he prisoner and the school child stand in
wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal con-
viction and incarceration.'1 53
The Court then added: "We are not yet ready to hold that the schools
and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 1 54
The next part of the Court's decision, to which there was dissent by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,'5 5 concerned whether a warrant
was required in the school setting, and under what circumstances a school
official may legally conduct a search. The Court employed a balancing
test. On one side of the scale was the "schoolchild's legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy" and on the other was the "school's equally legitimate
need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place.' 56
The Court explained:
Against the child's interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of
teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and
on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy,
but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms:
348. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 351. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 353, 370.
151. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333.
152. Id. at 336-37.
153. Id. at 338 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977)).
154. Id. at 338-39. The Court suggested that if the situation in the schools continues to
worsen, the Court may eventually decide to treat school children the same as prisoners. For
a Virginia case on a prisoner's expectation of privacy, see Marrero v. Commonwealth, 222
Va. 754, 284 S.E.2d 809 (1981) (upholding random searches of inmates, individually or col-
lectively, and their cells and lockers).
155. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338-40.
156. Id. at 430.
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drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social
problems. . . Even in schools that have been spared the most severe disci-
plinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational envi-
ronment requires close supervision of school children. 15,
The Court held that school officials need not obtain a warrant before
searching a student who is under their authority. The Court reasoned
that "[tihe warrant requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environ-
ment [since] requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a
child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law)
would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.'
15 s
Second, the Court held that "[tihe school setting also requires some
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a
search."' 59 The Court stated that the usual standard of probable cause
was not required because of the substantial need of teachers and school
officials for freedom to maintain order in the schools. The Court con-
cluded that a reasonableness standard was proper. The Court explained:
[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasona-
bleness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reason-
ableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider
'whether the ... action was justified at its inception'. . . second, one must
determine whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place. . . .' Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its inception' when there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
157. Id. at 339 (citation omitted). For similar arguments on the importance of giving
school officials flexibility so they can maintain order, see the concurring opinion of Justice
Powell:
Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to
educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to
protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers
themselves from violence by the few students whose conduct in recent years has
prompted national concern.
Id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Blackmun's concurring opinion, in which he
states:
Maintaining order in the classroom can be a difficult task. . . . Indeed, because drug
use and possession of weapons have become increasingly common among young peo-
ple, an immediate response frequently is required not just to maintain an environ-
ment conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of students and school
personnel.
Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Even Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, agreed that
school administrators must have "broad latitude to maintain order and discipline in . . .
classrooms." Id. at 385 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 340.
159. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of
the infraction.' 6"
Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, felt that the "Court's standard for
evaluating the 'scope' of reasonable school searches [was] obviously
designed to prohibit physically intrusive searches of students by persons
of the opposite sex for relatively minor offenses."'' He noted further:
"One thing is clear under any standard-the shocking strip searches that
are described in some cases have no place in the school house.' 62
The Court ruled only on the requirements of the fourth amendment of
the United States Constitution. As the Court itself noted, other states
may insist on a more demanding standard under their own constitutions
or statutes.6 3
The Court decided that the search involved in T.L.O. was not unrea-
sonable."" The assistant vice-principal was correct in initially opening the
purse since he had a reasonable suspicion that cigarettes were inside.
Once he saw the rolling papers, this gave him reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that marijuana was in the purse, and further search of the purse was
therefore proper. After finding the evidence of marijuana trafficking, the
assistant vice-principal's suspicion was sufficient to justify his examina-
tion of the two letters to determine whether they contained any addi-
tional evidence.
Justice Brennan's partial dissent argued for the retention of the proba-
ble cause requirement in the school setting. He found the balancing test
used by the Court in this case "flawed both in its inception and in its
execution."'61 5 Justice Stevens, also dissenting in part, agreed with the
Court about permitting student searches on less than probable cause
where a criminal violation was suspected. He would not have allowed,
however, searches upon suspicion of a violation of minor school rules. 6
Emphasizing the importance and impact of the Court's decision, Justice
Stevens observed:
The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have the opportunity
160. Id. at 341-42 (citations & footnotes omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20
(1968)).
161. Id. at 381 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 382 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
163. 469 U.S. at 343 n.10.
164. Id. at 343.
165. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
166. Id. at 377-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Under Stevens' test, the school official
would have to have "reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the student
is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the
educational process." Id. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis omitted).
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to experience the power of government. Through it passes every citizen and
public official, from school-teachers to policemen and prison guards. The
values they learn there, they take with them in life. One of our most cher-
ished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth Amendment: that the Gov-
ernment may not intrude on the personal privacy of its citizens without a
warrant or compelling circumstance. The Court's decision today is a curious
moral for the Nation's youth.167
C. The Issues Left Unresolved by T.L.O.
Numerous questions remain unanswered by the Court's decision in
T.L.O. These are now examined.
1. Application of the Exclusionary Rule
Because the Court in T.L.O. decided that the evidence obtained by the
public school official was not seized in violation of the fourth amendment,
it did not reach the question of whether the exclusionary rule 1 6 would
have applied if the search were constitutionally invalid. Furthermore, the
Court stated that it did not "implicitly determine that the exclusionary
rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school au-
thorities."'69 Although the Court did not consider the issue, Justice Ste-
vens believed the question should have been decided. In his partial dis-
sent, he argued that the exclusionary rule should apply. 7 ' Justices
Marshall and Brennan joined this part of his opinion.
Lower courts have split over whether evidence seized by school authori-
ties in violation of the fourth amendment should be excluded.' 1 There is
further disagreement over whether illegally seized evidence should be ex-
cluded only from criminal proceedings, or from school administrative dis-
ciplinary proceedings as well. 2
167. Id. at 385-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
168. The exclusionary rule is not a right of the defendant, but rather a court-imposed
remedy to control the conduct of police officers or other state agents to whom it applies. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Comment, School Search-The Supreme
Court's Adoption of a "Reasonable Suspicion" Standard in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and the
Heightened Need for Extension of the Exlusionary Rule to School Search Cases, S. ILL.
U.L.J. 263, 264-67 (1985).
169. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1985).
170. Id. at 371-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
171. Compare State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039
(1975) (exclusionary rule does not apply) with State v. Mora, 330 So. 2d 900, 901 (La.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976) (rule does apply). See generally Comment, supra note 168.
172. See, e.g., Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 237-38 (E.D. Tex.
1980); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1001 (D.N.H. 1976). For an article concerning the
exclusionary rule's application to the administrative disciplinary hearing context, see Com-
ment, The Exclusionary Rule in the Public School Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding:
Answering the Question after New Jersey v. T.L.O., 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1133 (1985-86).
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2. The Standard for Assessing the Legality of Searches Conducted by
School Officials in Conjunction With or at the Behest of Law Enforce-
ment Agencies
T.L.O. involved a search carried out by a school official acting alone,
without cooperation or guidance from the police or other law enforcement
agency. The Court in T.L.O. expressed no opinion on the standard that
would be appropriate for determining the legality of searches conducted
by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies. 173 Lower court cases that have considered this issue have gener-
ally agreed that where police officers conduct the search in a school or
where there is collaboration between the police and school officials, prob-
able cause is required for a valid search.' 4
One such case is Piazzola v. Watkins.'75 Although this case involved a
search conducted at a public university, the issue was essentially the same
as in public secondary school cases, because university officials in Ala-
bama could legally search only with reasonable cause. 7 6 In Piazzola, uni-
versity officials and law enforcement personnel searched student dormi-
tory rooms and the search resulted in a number of criminal prosecutions.
Noting that the search was "instigated and in the main executed by State
police and narcotic bureau officials" and that the only part the university
officials played in the search of the dormitory rooms was "at the request
and under the direction of the State law enforcement officers," the court
held that the search had to be based on probable cause and not just rea-
sonable cause.' 77
At a minimum, Piazzola suggests that probable cause is required for a
search in a public school setting where the search is either: (1) actually
conducted, wholly or in part, by law enforcement officers; or (2) directed
and supervised by law enforcement officers.
Probable cause should be required for a search where there is merely
cooperation (and not actual police participation) between school officials
and law enforcement officers for the same reason that there must be
probable cause for a search conducted by a private individual who acts as
an agent of the state. As a general rule, the fourth amendment does not
protect against searches by private persons, 7 ' but an exception has been
173. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985).
174.. See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624, 626 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d
284 (5th Cir. 1971); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-21 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
175. 316 F. Supp. 624.
176. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730-31 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
177. Piazzola, 316 F. Supp. at 626-27.
178. The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures ap-
plies only to government agents and not to private individuals acting on their own initiative.
Harmon v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 574, 166 S.E.2d 232 (1969).
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carved out for searches in cases where a private individual has become an
agent of the police by virtue of a police order or request, or because of his
cooperation in a criminal investigation." 9 The reason for this exception is
to prevent police subterfuge in an attempt to avoid warrant and probable
cause requirements.18 0 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,"' the United
States Supreme Court stated that a search by a private individual falls
within the fourth amendment if that individual, "in light of all the cir-
cumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an 'instru-
ment' or agent of the state."''
When school officials conduct the search, a remaining issue is how
much cooperation or contact with the police is necessary to render a
school official an agent of the police. In Martens v. Board of Education,8 3
a federal district court indicated that school officials would become police
agents, requiring probable cause instead of reasonable suspicion, if law
enforcement officers helped develop the facts of the school's reasonable
suspicion or directed the school authorities to conduct the search." The
court held a school official did not become an agent of the police merely
because a police officer at the school suggested that a student, already
being detained, empty his pockets as the school authorities had re-
quested.8 5 The court stated: "There is, here, no basis for thinking that
school official action was a subterfuge to avoid warrant and probable
cause requirements."'""
In State v. McKinnon, s7 the court embraced a more liberal view of the
degree of police involvement that is necessary before the probable cause
requirement will apply to searches by school officials. In McKinnon, a
confidential informant gave the chief of police a description of high school
students who sold drugs and who were carrying the drugs on that day.
The chief of police then relayed this information to the principal of the
high school. School officials searched the students and found drugs. The
principal then called the police, and the students were arrested. At their
trial, the students moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the
searches were invalid because they were instigated by the police., The
179. See, e.g., Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966); Machlan v. State, 248
Ind. 218, 225 N.E.2d 762 (1967).
180. See Corngold, 367 F.2d at 5.
181. 403 U.S. 443, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971).
182. Id. at 487.
183. 620 F. Supp. 29 (D.C. Ill. 1985).
184. Id. at 32.
185. The court also noted that there was "no indication that a criminal investigation was
contemplated, that this was a cooperative effort with law enforcement, or that but for [the
police officer's] intervention [the student] would not have been searched eventually." Id.
(citation omitted).
186. Id.
187. 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977).
188. Id. at -, 558 P.2d at 783.
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court rejected the students' argument, however, holding that the searches
needed only to have been based on reasonable grounds. Even though the
only basis for the reasonable grounds was information given by the police
chief, the court held there was no joint action."8 9 The court pointed out
that:
[A]t no time did the chief of police instruct the principal to search the [stu-
dents] or detain them .... [The police chief] merely relayed the informa-
tion he had received to the principal, and the principal then acted indepen-
dently in contacting [the students] .... The fact that the principal called
the chief of police after conducting the search does not indicate complicity.
If the principal had received this information from sources other than the
police, he then would be under a duty both to conduct a search and notify
the police of his discoveries. We find no difference here.'
The problem presented by the adoption of different standards for
school officials and police officers becomes quite complicated when "youth
officers" are involved. Youth officers are police officers who operate inside
the public schools. The youth officer program has grown rapidly in recent
years and has been adopted by numerous school districts in Virginia.
Youth officers have all the powers of police officers, yet they are also like
school officials because they are permanently assigned to a particular
school. These quasi-police, quasi-school officials serve three purposes: (1)
they foster better relations and increase communication between students
and police; (2) they help maintain order in the schools; and (3) they han-
dle any criminal matters that arise.' 91
Since the youth officer operates as both a police officer and a school
official the question arises as to what standard (probable cause warrant
requirement or reasonable suspicion) governs searches by youth officers in
the public schools. The T.L.O. Court's opinion could be read to support
the reasonable suspicion standard. Applying the balancing test used in
T.L.O., the youth officer's role in maintaining security and order in the
school may be deemed more important than students' rights to privacy.
An equally compelling argument can be made, however, that the youth
officer must have a warrant based upon probable cause for a constitution-
ally valid search.' 92 This is because the youth officer, unlike other school
189. Id. at -, 558 P.2d at 784-85.
190. Id. at -, 558 P.2d at 785.
191. The youth officer program has proven successful in accomplishing all three goals.
Some of the information on the youth officer program in this article was supplied by John
Holliday, a youth officer for the City of Salem, Virginia, Police Department.
192. The probable cause standard would probably not apply, however, where only the
violation of a school rule is involved. In this situation, the youth officer arguably would be
acting only as a school official.
In some cases, a youth officer has been able to establish probable cause for a search easily.
In People v. Tippit, 17 Ill. App. 3d 163, 308 N.E.2d 15 (1974), a police officer assigned to a
high school brought two students to the principal's office for loitering in the hall of the
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officials, has law enforcement responsibility. Justice Powell noted this im-
portant distinction between school officials and police officers in T.L.O.:19 '
Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects. These
officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity, to locate and
arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing
of such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship
exist between school authorities and pupils.19
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. McKinnon also drew this dis-
tinction. The court stated: "The high school principal is not a law en-
forcement officer. His job does not concern the discovery and prevention
of crime.' '1 9
5
Another important reason for applying the probable cause warrant
standard to youth officer searches is that if this higher standard did not
apply, youth officers would be used as a subterfuge by "outside" law en-
forcement officers (to which the probable cause requirement would
apply).196
The risk of subterfuge remains even if the probable cause warrant re-
quirement is applied to youth officer searches. This is because the school
official needs only reasonable suspicion to conduct a search. The issue is
also raised of how much collaboration is needed between school officials
and youth officers before the school officials are considered agents of the
police and full constitutional protections apply.197 Unlike the contacts
with "outside" police officers, some contacts will occur daily between
school officials and the youth officer. The frequency of these contacts ex-
aggerates the problem and makes the need to find a solution more urgent.
No cases have specifically addressed the problem, and unfortunately
the Virginia General Assembly has not yet enacted guidelines for the
youth officer program. The "outside" police officer collaboration cases,
school. Another police officer present in the office at the time detected a scent of marijuana.
The court held that the marijuana odor gave the officer probable cause to believe an offense
was being committed, and therefore the search, which produced a gun but no marijuana,
was deemed lawful. Id. at -, 308 N.E.2d at 16-17. This case is in accord with Fourth
Circuit cases which have held that probable cause may be supported by the detection of
distinctive odors such as marijuana. United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 233-34, 236 (4th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981); United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845, 848
(4th Cir. 1974).
193. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring). Of course, on the other hand, one of the pur-
poses of the youth officer program is to minimize the adversafial nature of the relationship
between students and the police.
195. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at _, 558 P.2d at 784.
196. Moreover, if a court holds that youth officers need only reasonable suspicion, it
would also invariably have to hold that any search in a school conducted by any law en-
forcement officer would require only reasonable suspicion to be constitutionally valid.
197. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 183-90.
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discussed earlier, offer some guidance. Under the cases decided so far, the
youth officer could not conduct the search himself,""s direct the school
authorities to conduct the search,199 or request that they do so' 00 without
triggering the probable cause requirement. However, the youth officer
may be able to provide information to a school official which constitutes
the sole basis for the school official's reasonable suspicion.'0 1
3. Searches of Lockers and Cars
T.L.O. involved the search of a student's purse. The Court did not de-
cide whether a student has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers,
desks, or other school property provided for the storage of school sup-
plies.2"2 The Court also did not consider the issue of searches of students'
cars parked in the school parking lot.
Commentators generally have ranked the expectation of privacy in a
school locker and in a car parked in the school lot as less than that in a
purse or pocket.' 0 ' Among the four items, the locker is the least private




Several courts have held that students do not possess a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their school lockers.20 5 Three reasons have been
offered to support this holding. The most important reason is that school
198. See Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624, 626-27 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d
284 (5th Cir. 1971).
199. See McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at -, 558 P.2d at 785.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 n.5 (1985). Only areas entitled to a reasona-
ble or legitimate expectation of privacy are protected by the fourth amendment. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967). The expectation of privacy is reasonable if it
meets two requirements: (1) an actual or subjective expectation by the defendant; and (2)
the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984).
203. See Reamey, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court's Lesson on School
Searches, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 933, 945 n.82 (1984-85); Trosch, Williams & Devore, supra note
142, at 51.
204. Reamey, supra note 203, at 945 n.82.
205. See, e.g., Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 670 (10th Cir. 1981) ("Inasmuch as the
school had assumed joint control of the locker it cannot be successfully maintained that the
school did not have a right to inspect it."); State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 640, 456 P.2d 1, 3
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 947 (1970) ("it [is] a proper function of school authorities to
inspect the lockers under their control and to prevent their use . . . for illegal purposes.");
People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969) (school adminis-
trators have power to consent to search of student's locker).
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officials possess the master key. "The rationale is that even if a student
subjectively considered his locker to be private, his knowledge of the exis-
tence of a master key makes his expectation unreasonable."20 6 A second
reason is that the locker is, at least jointly, school property. The school
administrators thus have the power to consent to the search of a student's
locker.107 However, this rationale is somewhat weak in light of the Su-
preme Court's removal of the requirement that a person have a property
right in the object of the search before he can invoke fourth amendment
protection.0 s
A third basis offered to support the proposition that the student does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a school locker is that the
"[l]ockers are generally located in public areas such as hallways where
their contents are exposed to the view of passersby whenever the user
opens the door. '20 9 The United States Supreme Court has stated: "What
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."2 1 This rationale is
faulty, however, when applied to school lockers. Although contraband in
"plain view" would be subject to seizure by a police officer or school offi-
cial who had a right to be in a position to view the objects," it is quite
another matter to say that since the contents of a locker could be in plain
view, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the locker. Other
courts have adopted the view that a student does have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the contents of his locker. This view emphasizes
the subjective expectation of the student over the reasonableness of the
expectation. In State v. Engerud,1 2 the court stated:
We are satisfied that in the context of this case the student had an expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of his locker .... For the four years of high
school, the school locker is a home away from home. In it the student stores
the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment.213
206. Comment, Searches by Drug Detection Dogs in Pennsylvania Public Schools: A
Constitutional Analysis, 85 Dic L. REv. 143, 147-48 (1980).
207. The Virginia courts have held that "the consent to search given by one with common
authority over property is valid, as against the absent, non-consenting person with whom
the authority is shared." Black v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 277, 283, 288 S.E.2d 449, 452
(1982).
208. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
209. Delgado, College Searches and Seizures: Students, Privacy, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 70 (1974-75).
210. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
211. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); United States v. Cobler,
533 F. Supp. 407, 410 (W.D. Va. 1982). The plain view doctrine holds that the mere looking
at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Duffield v. Peyton, 209 Va. 178, 183, 162
S.E.2d 915, 918 (1968). Accordingly, no warrant or probable cause is required.
212. 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983), rev'd sub nom. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
213. Engerud, 94 N.J. at -, 463 A.2d at 943 (citation omitted) (The court noted, how-
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A commentator has observed:
[A]part from the integrity of his own body, [the student's] locker is one of
his few harbors of privacy within the school. It is the only place where he
may be able to store what he seeks to preserve as private-letters from a
girl friend, applications for a job, poetry he is writing, books that may be
ridiculed because they are too simple or too advanced, or dancing shoes he
may be embarrassed to own.2"4
Courts adopting this view have held that the proper standard for the
search of lockers is reasonable suspicion.2 15
b. Cars
Few cases have considered the issue of searches of a student's car
parked in a school parking lot. There is no contention that students do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cars.216 The stu-
dent's use of the car is exclusive. The one case found that considered the
search of students' cars in the school parking lot by school officials ap-
plied the reasonable suspicion standard.2 17
4. Is Individualized Suspicion an Essential Element of the Reasonable-
ness Standard?
In T.L.O., the assistant vice-principal's suspicions centered upon the
student whose purse he searched. The Court therefore stated that it did
not need to decide "whether individualized suspicion is an essential ele-
ment of the reasonableness standard" adopted for searches by school au-
thorities.21 s The Court did note, however, that although some quantum of
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure, the fourth amendment imposes no irreducible require-
ment of such suspicion.2"9
Lower court cases have taken the position that individualized suspicion
ever, that this expectation would not exist if a master key had been used in the past to
make occasional inspections). Also stating this as the New Jersey rule, see Falter v. Veterans
Admin., 632 F. Supp. 196, 212 (D.N.J. 1986).
214. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IowA
L. REV. 739, 773 (1974).
215. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 482 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 693 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); State v.
Joseph T., 336 S.E.2d 728, 736 (W. Va. 1985).
216. Some have suggested, however, that the plain view exception can be applied to cars
in some instances where contraband can be seen by looking into a car window. See United
States v. Cobler, 533 F. Supp. 407, 410 (W.D. Va. 1982).
217. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 482 (5th Cir.), reh'g de-
nied, 693 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
218. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985).
219. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)).
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is required for a number of types of school searches. In Kuehn v. Renton
School District,220 the Supreme Court of Washington afforded fourth
amendment protection to a high school student who challenged his
school's policy of searching the luggage of students who were going on a
band concert tour. The school's policy was inspired by an incident two
years earlier when two students on a similar tour were caught with liquor
in their hotel rooms. Holding the search unreasonable because of the lack
of individualized suspicion, the court stated:
The validity of searches of school children by school officials is judged by
the reasonable belief standard. The reasonable belief standard requires that
there be a reasonable belief on the part of the searching school official that
the individual student searched possesses a prohibited item. When school
officials search large groups of students solely for the purpose of deterring
disruptive conduct and without any suspicion of each individual searched,
the search does not meet the reasonable belief standard. Because the search
at issue here was conducted without individualized suspicion the student's
rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated.22
The court in Bellnier v. Lund reached the same conclusion. 222 In Lund,
a class of fifth-grade students were ordered by school authorities to "strip
down to their undergarments" after three dollars allegedly were stolen.2
23
The court determined that the search was unreasonable since there was
"no reasonable suspicion to believe that each student searched possessed
contraband or evidence of a crime. 224
D. The T.L.O. Reasonable Suspicion Standard
Under T.L.O. 225 a search is justified at its inception only if the school
official possesses a reasonable suspicion that the search will produce evi-
dence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or school
rules. One court explained the standard as follows:
To justify a search under [the school rules] on the basis of reasonable suspi-
cion, an official must be aware of specific articulable facts, together with
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion....
In passing on the legality of such a search, we must consider all the sur-
rounding circumstances.2 2
220. 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985).
221. Id. at -, 694 P.2d at 1079. Interestingly, the Kuehn court also found that parent
chaperones, who helped in conducting the searches, were state agents, because the parents
"conducted the search with the sanction and enforcement authority of the school officials."
Id. at -, 694 P.2d at 1081. Thus, the court applied the same standard to searches by
parents and school officials-reasonable suspicion.
222. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
223. Id. at 50.
224. Id. at 54.
225. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
226. United States v. Most, 789 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1986).
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The following two cases illustrate this standard.
In Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 27 a student was seen by a school
security guard"' "ducking" behind a car in the school parking lot when
she should have been in class. When asked to identify herself, the student
gave a false name. The student was taken to the assistant principal's of-
fice who believed from the foregoing that the girl possessed illegal drugs.
A female school official was instructed to search the student. The student
first was made to dump the contents of her purse on a desk. She then was
instructed to turn her jean pockets inside out. The student subsequently
removed her jeans. She then was required to bend over so that the school
official could visually examine the contents of her bra. Drugs were not
found. The court found that the strip search violated the student's fourth
amendment rights because the school officials did not have reasonable
suspicion to justify the search.22" The court stated:
It is clear that [the student's] conduct created reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting that some school rule or law had been violated. However, it does not
create a reasonable suspicion that a search would turn up evidence of drug
usage. [The student's] conduct was clearly ambiguous. It could have indi-
cated that she was truant, or that she was stealing hubcaps, or that she had
left class to meet a boyfriend. In short, it could have signified that [she] had
violated any of an infinite number of laws or school rules.230
Because the court found that the strip search was unreasonable at its in-
ception, the court found it unnecessary to address the second prong of
the T.L. 0. test.231
In State v. Joseph T., the court applied the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard to a search of a student's locker.2 2 In that case, a school official
noticed the smell of alcohol on a student. The student confessed that on
the way to school he had consumed beer at the home of Joseph T., an-
other student. Suspecting that Joseph T. might have brought some type
of alcoholic beverage into school, school officials searched his locker. Al-
though no alcoholic beverages were found, the officials found pipes, wrap-
ping paper, and a small plastic box containing marijuana in a pocket of a
jacket in the locker.
The court found that, although there was not probable cause, there
227. 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
228. A school security guard has no police power, and is subject to the same standard as
school officials.
229. Cales, 635 F. Supp. at 457.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 336 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1985).
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were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the locker contained an alco-
holic beverage in violation of school rules. The court also found that the
discovery of the marijuana in the locker was reasonably related to the
search for alcoholic beverages.2 33 Accordingly, the court held that the
search did not constitute a violation of the student's constitutional
rights. 2
34
In a partial dissent, the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia agreed with the adoption of the reasonable suspicion
standard for the search of school lockers.2 35 He believed, however, that
the school officials did not have reasonable suspicion:
[T]here were no articulable facts which would lead a reasonably prudent
person to suspect the defendant had alcoholic beverages in his locker. The
only evidence was that his friend had consumed a beer at the defendant's
home before school. This information gave no indication that the defendant
had alcoholic beverages in his locker.2 36
The chief justice also observed that even if there was reasonable suspi-
cion, the search exceeded what was necessary to determine if alcoholic
beverages were present. "The only objective of the search would have
been to discover the existence of alcoholic beverages in the defendant's
locker. Yet, rather than pat down the defendant's jacket, the school ad-
ministrator made a detailed examination into its pockets. '237
E. Other Searches
In recent years, school administrators have begun to use a number of
other types of searches to help maintain order and discipline in the public
schools. The use of drug-sniffing dogs, metal detectors, and drug testing
has sparked considerable controversy. To many, these seem to be extreme
measures when applied to school children. Moreover, these measures are
frequently not based on individualized suspicion. Thus, there is an intru-
sion into the privacy not only of students who actually are, or are individ-
ually suspected to be in violation of the law or a school rule, but also the
majority of students who are innocent. Whether this intrusion is out-
weighed by the school officials' need to maintain order and discipline is,
as with the other issues concerning student rights, the focus of the courts'
inquiry.
233. Id. at 737.
234. Id. at 737-38.
235. Id. at 740 (Miller, C.J., dissenting in part).
236. Id. at 741.
237. Id.
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1. Use of Drug-Sniffing Dogs
In United States v. Place,238 the United States Supreme Court stated
that the sniffing of luggage by a dog to discover drugs does not constitute
a search under the fourth amendment.2 9 Although the Court's statement
was read by some to be merely dictum, in United States v. Jacobsen24 0
the Court referred to this statement as a holding.24 1 The Court reasoned
that the sniff is "much less intrusive" than a typical search and does not
tell authorities anything about the presence of non-contraband items.2 2
In so holding, the Court adopted the majority view of lower courts.24 3
Only the Ninth Circuit had held that the sniffing of objects by a dog was
a search.244 Since the sniffing of objects by dogs is not a search, the fourth
amendment is not violated. Therefore, both the police and school officials,
are free to use this method.
Following Place, the Fifth Circuit held in Horton v. Goose Creek Inde-
pendent School District245 that the use of drug-detecting dogs to sniff
school lockers and cars parked in the school parking lot did not constitute
a search.2 46 Since the fourth amendment did not apply, the court stated
that it need not consider the reasonableness of the use of the drug-de-
tecting dogs.247 The Horton court also held that a positive reaction by a
drug-sniffing dog to a locker or car would give the school officials reasona-
ble suspicion to search that locker or car, provided that there was evi-
dence that the dog could reliably identify the current presence of
drugs.2 4 s
238. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
239. Id. at 707.
240. 466 U.S. 109, 123-24 (1984).
241. Lower courts have viewed the Place language as conclusive. See, e.g., United States
v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984).
242. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
243. Some lower courts have relied upon the "plain smell doctrine" in holding that dog
sniffing is not a search. The plain smell doctrine, not expressly adopted by the Supreme
Court, is analogous to the plain view doctrine. Courts adopting this doctrine have reasoned
that the dog is a mere sense enhancer supplementing the officer's smell, just as a flashlight
enhances his sight. Thus, just as no search occurs when the policeman smells a distinctive
odor, such as marijuana (as long as a policemen has the right to be where he is when he
smells the odor), courts argue that no search occurs when a dog uses its olfactory senses.
Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); see also, United States v. Venema, 563 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.
1977) (police use of cannabis-detecting dog to sniff the air outside of locker rented from
storage company was not a search).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976). After Place was de-
cided, the Ninth Circuit overruled Solis in United States v. Beale, 736 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir.
1984) (sniff of luggage by a narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search).
245. 690 F.2d 470.
246. Id. at 477.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 482.
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The Supreme Court has never dealt explicitly with whether dog sniffs
of people constitute searches. This presents an entirely different problem
than dog sniffs of objects since dog sniffs of people are more intrusive.
There has been conflict among the lower court cases over whether the use
of dogs to sniff students is a search.
Doe v. Renfrow'4 9 was the first case to consider whether sniffs of school
children constituted a search. There, the court held that the use of the
dogs by the school, with the assistance of the police, did not constitute a
search. The court noted the diminished expectations of privacy by stu-
dents in a public school, the school officials' duty to maintain order and a
sound educational environment, and the minimal intrusion involved.2 50
There was no evidence that the sniffing dogs ever actually touched the
school children. The opinion in Doe has been widely criticized by
commentators.
251
The decision in Jones v. Latexo Independent School District25 2 has
met with more favorable response. There the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas granted a preliminary injunction against the
use of dogs to sniff school-children. The court found that the use of snif-
fing dogs was intrusive and constituted an unreasonable search under the
fourth amendment. The court also based its decision on the fact that the
school officials had no particularized suspicion.25 3
The Fifth Circuit considered this issue as well in Horton v. Goose
Creek Independent School District.25 4 There, the court held that the
sniffing of the students was a search. The court placed great emphasis on
the fact that there was evidence that the dogs made contact with the chil-
dren while sniffing them.2 55 The court stated:
[I]ntentional close proximity sniffing of the person is offensive whether the
sniffer be canine or human. One can imagine the embarassment which a
young adolescent, already self-conscious about his or her body, might expe-
rience when a dog, being handled by a representative of the school adminis-
tration, enters the classroom specifically for the purpose of sniffing the air
around his or her person. 56
249. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F. 2d 91 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981).
250. Id. at 1022.
251. See, e.g., Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-Perspectives on Fourth
Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 803 (1980); Note, Use of Drug Detecting Dogs in Pub-
lic High Schools, 56 IND. L.J. 321 (1981); Comment, Search and Seizure in Public Schools:
Are Our Children's Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 119 (1979). Doe is in
accord with the plain smell doctrine, discussed supra note 243. Under this doctrine, there
would be no difference between sniffs of objects and sniffs of people, where there is no
physical contact between the dog and the person.
252. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
253. Id. at 235.
254. 690 F.2d 470.
255. Id. at 478 (The dogs "put their noses right up against the children's bodies.").
256. Id. at 479. The court did not decide whether the use of dogs to sniff people at a
distance is a search. See id.
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The court added that the dogs' "sniffing around each child, putting his
nose on the child and scratching and manifesting other signs of excite-
ment in the case of an alert-is intrusive. 257
Finding that the dog sniffing of students was a search, the court then
considered whether the search was permissible under the fourth amend-
ment. The court observed initially that:
When society requires large groups of students, too young to be considered
capable of mature restraint in their use of illegal substances or dangerous
instrumentalities, it assumes a duty to protect them from dangers posed by
anti-social activities-their own and those of other students-and to pro-
vide them with an environment in which education is possible. To fulfill
that duty, teachers and school administrators must have broad supervisory
and disciplinary powers. 258
The court concluded, however, that "[tihe intrusion on dignity and per-
sonal security that goes with the type of canine inspection of the stu-
dent's person involved in this case cannot be justified by the need to pre-
vent abuse of drugs and alcohol when there is no individualized suspicion,
and we hold it unconstitutional."2 59
Summarizing the law in this area, it is well-established that the sniffing
by drug-detecting dogs of school lockers and cars parked on school prem-
ises does not constitute a "search." Horton states that dog sniffing of stu-
dents would be a search where the dog makes physical contact with the
child. It is an unconstitutional search if it is not based on individualized
suspicion. If individualized suspicion is required, however, the usefulness
of dog sniffing is arguably minimized, if not eliminated. If a school official
had reasonable suspicion to believe that a particular student possessed
drugs, the official himself could search the student. Finally, the courts are
split on whether the sniffing of the school children constitutes a search
where the dogs do not touch the students.
2. Use of Metal Detectors
Some schools have installed metal detectors (magnetometers) in school
entrances. As they enter, students are screened for knives, guns, or other
weapons. As yet, no court has decided whether use of metal detectors in
public schools is constitutional. However, some courts have upheld the
use of metal detectors in other contexts. 6 °
257. Id.
258. Id. at 480.
259. Id. at 481-82.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 947 (1972); see also United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972). Magnetometer screening is conducted, for
example, in airports, courthouses, and prisons.
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In United States v. Epperson,26' the Fourth Circuit allowed the use of
general magnetometer searches in airports. Employing a balancing test,
the court weighed the danger of air piracy against the plaintiff's fourth
amendment interests and found that the search was reasonable.2"2
In United States v. DeAngeo,26 3 the Fourth Circuit found that a mag-
netometer search was reasonable in light of the fact that the passenger
had the choice of travelling by other means and was given notice by signs
in the terminal that a search would be conducted. 264 The court concluded,
therefore, that the passenger consented to the search because he volunta-
rily passed through the magnetometer. 265
Whether magnetometers are found to be constitutionally permissible in
Virginia public schools may depend upon whether the court relies upon
Epperson or DeAngelo. If the court finds that, under DeAngelo, students
must consent to magnetometers before they can be used, then arguably,
they should not be allowed in the schools because students are compelled
to attend school. Unlike the air traveller, the student has no choice but to
pass through the magnetometer. Thus there can be no voluntary consent
to the search.
On the other hand, if the court applies the Epperson court's reasoning,
it may hold that the benefits of the search (maintenance of order and
discipline in the school), outweigh the intrusion on the students' privacy
rights. If the courts adopt the Epperson approach, they should scrutinize
the history of violent incidents at each particular school before engaging
in the balancing test. Not all schools will be troubled with the sort of
violence that mandates use of a magnetometer and courts should be care-
ful not to draw unsubstantiated conclusions about their necessity.
It should be noted here that metal detectors are primarily useful for
general searches. Thus, even if a court does not employ an Epperson bal-
ancing test to strike down the use of metal detectors in a public school,
the court may hold that they can be used only when school officials have
individualized suspicions. If individualized suspicion is required then, as
with sniffing dogs, the usefulness of metal detectors will be all but
eliminated.
261. 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
262. Id. at 771-72.
263. 584 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
264. Id. at 47-48.
265. Id. at 48.
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3. Use of Drug Testing
The use of drug testing"" in the public schools is a very recent develop-
ment. Although there are few cases on the issue of drug testing, there is
already "strong authority for the proposition that taking a person's urine
and testing it for drugs is a search. 261 7 Therefore, the fourth amendment
applies.
Unlike drug-sniffing dogs and metal detectors, drug testing is useful as
a particularized form of a search as well as a general search. School offi-
cials cannot determine in other ways whether a student has been taking
drugs. Accordingly, drug testing can be limited by school authorities to
cases where they have individualized suspicion. Nevertheless, schools
have used drug testing as a general search of large groups of students.
The validity of this practice depends on whether the courts will require
individualized suspicion. Drug testing which is not based on individual-
ized suspicion, has been allowed in other contexts, for example, with per-
sonnel in the armed forces,"" prisoners, 269 and employees in highly regu-
lated industries.2 7 0
In Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional School District,2 1
a New Jersey court considered the constitutionality of a high school pol-
icy requiring all students to submit annual urine samples for drug testing.
The school had a population of 516 students.2 7 2 In the previous school
year, some twenty-eight students had made inquiry or were referred to
the student assistant counselor concerning drug use.27 3 The school at-
tempted to justify the drug testing by contending that the urine samples
were not being taken solely for the purpose of drug screening, but also to
be tested for other forms of physical defects as part of the pupil medical
examination mandated by New Jersey statute2 7 4 The school added that
under its program, no civil or criminal sanctions would be imposed in the
event of a positive test. 7 5 In the case of a positive urine test, the doctor,
parents, and student would discuss whether or not there was a
problem.2 7 6
266. For purposes of this comment, "drug testing" refers to analysis of a urine specimen
for the presence of controlled substances.
267. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Storms v. Cough-
lin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Re-
gional School Dist., 211 N.J. Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
268. Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
269. Storms, 600 F. Supp. 1214.
270. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
271. 211 N.J. Super. 54, 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1955).
272. Id. at -, 510 A.2d at 710.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at -, 510 A.2d at 711.
276. Id.
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Despite the school's arguments, the court found the drug-testing pro-
gram to be a violation of the fourth amendmentY.2  Noting that the drug
testing violated the reasonable privacy expectations of school children,
the court stated:
[The school's] activities are not reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which initially justified the interference. School policy already pro-
vides for exclusion and/or suspension of students who are involved with
drug activity. The raw numbers and percentages of students referred to a
student assistance counseling as compared with the total student body is
not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the in-
terference, urinalysis, in the first place." 8
Recognizing the constitutional problems inherent in universal drug-
testing programs, some schools have attempted to develop reasonable
programs which will pass constitutional muster. The drug-testing pro-
gram adopted by Salem High School in Salem, Virginia, beginning in the
1986-87 academic year, is typical of this new breed of testing. Under the
Salem drug-testing program, a student must sign a form expressly con-
senting to the submission of urine samples for the purpose of drug testing
in order to participate in athletic extracurricular activities (sports and
cheerleading). A student who refuses to consent is not allowed to partici-
pate in the extracurricular activity. If a urine sample is later requested
from a consenting student and it tests positive for drugs, the student and
his or her parents must attend counseling. If there is a second positive
test, the student is dismissed from the team or squad. An important fea-
ture of this program is that the only students who are actually asked to
submit a urine sample are those whom school officials reasonably suspect
are using drugs. Salem's drug-testing program would therefore meet an
individualized reasonable suspicion requirement.
In addition to the fact that the Salem program is limited to situations
where there is individualized reasonable suspicion, there are two other
important differences between the Salem program and the program inval-
idated in Odenheim. First, the Salem program attempts to use the ex-
press consent of the students to avoid any fourth amendment deficiencies.
It is well-settled that a search that is consented to is not unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. 7 9 Thus, reasonable suspicion is not re-
quired where there is consent to the search. There may be some question,
277. The court also found the program violative of the due process clause because failure
to submit a urine sample could result in "exclusion" of the student from classroom study.
The court saw this as an attempt to circumvent procedural due process requirements that
would apply to students whom the school wanted to expel or suspend for illicit drug activ-
ity. Id. at -, 510 A.2d at 713.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1945)).
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however, whether the Salem students' consent is valid. "Consent to a
search, in order to be voluntary, must be unequivocal, specific and intelli-
gently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and it is not
lightly to be inferred. 28 0 The burden is on the state to prove the volunta-
riness of a consent to search.28 1 "In a school context, students may not
realize that they have a constitutional right to object to a search and the
Supreme Court has held that mere submission to a show of authority viti-
ates consent and that coercion is not allowed."28 2
Salem students are barred from participating in extracurricular activi-
ties unless they consent to the drug testing. Accordingly, the express con-
sent given by the Salem students may not be voluntary.
This leads to the second difference between the Salem program and the
Odenheim program. The Salem program does not test all students. It of-
fers students a choice, in that they do not have to engage in extracurricu-
lar activities and thus do not have to submit to drug testing. This differ-
ence gives the school an implied consent argument, just as in the airport
magnetometer screening cases, and also arguably makes the search less
intrusive and more reasonable.
In Odenheim, there was no choice. Students were compelled to attend
school and all students attending the school had to submit to drug test-
ing. Moreover, although public school attendance is a right,22 participat-
ing in a school extracurricular activity is only a privilege .2 4 For example,
courts have held that a student has no right to participate in interscholas-
tic athletics. 8 5 Thus, there appears to be no remedy available to a stu-
dent who wishes to participate in an extracurricular activity, but refuses
to consent to drug testing and is therefore not allowed to participate.
V. CONCLUSION
In our public school system today, there is a giant tug of war in pro-
gress. Yet, no winner is likely to emerge. Although it is true that public
schools should teach the student discipline, it is equally true that the
280. 16 MICHIE'S JUR. Searches and Seizures § 8, at 441 (Repl. Vol. 1987); accord Via v.
Peyton, 284 F. Supp. 961, 967 (W.D. Va. 1968); Hairston v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 387, 219
S.E.2d 668 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
281. Black v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 277, 283, 288 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1982). There is a
presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
282. Trosch, Williams & Devore, supra note 142, at 46.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
284. Some extracurricular activities may be protected, however, by the first amendment.
Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 552 F.2d 681, 682 (6th Cir. 1976).
285. Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir.
1970); Hamilton v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 552 F.2d 681, 682 (6th Cir.
1976).
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schools should teach the student the importance of civil rights. Giving
school officials too much power achieves the first goal at the expense of
the second. Conversely, when school officials have too little authority the
second goal is achieved at the expense of the first. The rights of the stu-
dent are sacrificed in either scenario and, ultimately, the balancing is of
student rights against student rights.
On one side of the scale is the student's right to an education, which is
hindered by disorder in the schools. On the other side, is the student's
civil rights under the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. If the
scale tips too far in one direction the schools become "war zones." If the
scale tips too far in the other direction, they become "prisons." A correct
balance must be struck or both students and society will lose.
Todd Holliday

